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INTRODUCTION
In America, policy is a primary concern in creating,
implementing, and interpreting the law. What happens when policy
interests conflict? Which rights dominate? In the context of media
broadcast, transmission, and storage, the Supreme Court of the United
States has recently skirted these questions when balancing the
competing interests of technological innovation and copyright law.
Over the centuries, Congress has legislated increasingly in favor of
copyright interests, overturning Supreme Court jurisprudence to the
contrary. However, the Constitution provides Congress with the power
to advance both the arts and sciences.1 Congress should allow science
to advance, in the form of technological innovation, in balance with
protecting original works of authorship.
As technology continues to develop in the form of new devices
and new means to perform, display, and access digital content, the
inherent conflict between protecting original works of authorship and
fostering technological innovation will increase. As discussed in this
Article, copyright is federal statutory protection of original works of
authorship.2 “‘Copyright’ literally means the right to copy. The term
has come to mean that body of exclusive rights granted by law to
authors for protection of their work.”3 Pertinent to this Article are 17
U.S.C. § 106(4) and (5), which grant the copyright owner the exclusive
right to “perform”4 and “display,”5 respectively, “motion pictures and
other audiovisual works . . . publicly.”6
In the 2014 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.
ruling (“Aereo”),7 the Supreme Court interpreted the Copyright Act’s
“public performance” and “transmit” clauses in such a way that content
retransmission through cloud services or remote storage equipment
clearly breach the copyright owner’s exclusive right to “perform” or
“display” her works.8 Yet, in the same opinion, the Court expressly
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS: UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/
circ1a.html.
3. Id.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2016).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2016).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)–(5) (2016).
7. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2502–03 (2014) (Through its “servers,
transcoders, and thousands of dime-sized antennas,” Aereo’s subscribers received broadcast
television over the Internet for a monthly charge. Television producers, distributors, and
broadcasters sued, alleging copyright infringement.).
8. Matt Schruers, Why Aereo Matters to the Cloud: A Primer, DISRUPTIVE
COMPETITION PROJECT (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.project-disco.org/intellectualproperty/030414-why-aereo-matters-to-the-cloud-a-primer/ (Broadcasters’ definition of
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refused to address whether copyright infringement occurs in “cloud
computing, remote storage DVRs, and other novel issues.”9 Aereo’s
narrow ruling10 suggests that the Supreme Court may be wary of
creating a blanket rule for retransmission in light of the broadening
technological mediums and capabilities.11
When the Copyright Act12 is enforced against media transmission
technologies such as the DVR and cloud computing,13 technological
development is stifled to the detriment of our society.14 Where the
Court declines to rule, certain companies and technologies will
continue to boom, but other entities and devices such as Aereo’s
antenna15 may not be so fortunate.16 Additionally, potential innovations
may be precluded from entering the market for lack of investment due
to the unpredictable nature of the courts in this context.
This Article will explore the history of the Copyright Act and its
application to the transmission of copyrighted works in the media.17
Because of the 1976 Amendment to the Copyright Act and the
public performance in Aereo is very similar to “multiple people stor[ing] their own, unique,
lawfully acquired copy of the latest hit single in the cloud, and then play[ing] it to
themselves over the Internet,” which is exactly what cloud storage technologies like
Dropbox, SkyDrive, iCloud, and Google Drive enable.).
9. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511 (“We agree with the Solicitor General that [q]uestions
involving cloud computing, [remote storage] DVRs, and other novel issues not before the
Court, as to which Congress has not plainly marked [the] course, should await a case in
which they are squarely presented.”).
10. Ruchir Patel, The Legal Lag Behind Emerging Technology: Aereo - Innovation or
Exploit?, BOSTON COLLEGE INTELLECTUAL PROP. & TECH. FORUM, July 16 2015, 1, 4; see
also infra note 243 and accompanying text.
11. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding, Aereo has since been applied
narrowly, only relevant to community antenna television provider cases. Capitol Records,
Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 48 F. Supp. 3d 703, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that issues
regarding third party domains “are beyond Aereo’s reach”).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016), et seq.
13. Enforcement thus far has been selective. See Patrick Hughes, Aereo’s Online TV
Service Violates Copyright Law, High Court Rules, 32 WESTLAW JOURNAL COMPUTER AND
INTERNET 3 (2014) (“The court said it has yet to consider if public performance rights are
infringed by such actions as the remote storage of content.”).
14. Blake Covington Norvell, The Modern First Amendment and Copyright Law, 18 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 547, 548 (2009) (“DMCA [Digital Millenium Copyright Act], section
1201 is unconstitutional.”).
15. Aereo’s antenna transmits subscribers broadcast television programming over the
Internet, essentially simultaneously with the broadcast. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.
16. Ali Sternburg, 8 Passages from the Supreme Court’s Aereo Decision that May
Have Negative Implications for the Cloud, DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT (June 25,
2014),
http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/062514-8-passages-supremecourts-aereo-decision-may-negative-implications-cloud (“The certainty provided by Cartoon
Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2008) (popularly known as
Cablevision) led to additional investment in U.S. cloud computing companies ranging from
$728 million to $1.3 billion during the two years after the decision.”).
17. All discussion will be regarding economic rights, not moral rights.
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Supreme Court’s narrow ruling in Aereo,18 it is unclear which
technologies will survive Supreme Court review without congressional
action. With a somewhat arbitrary delineation on the books,
technological business prospects have become increasingly murky.
This uncertainty, combined with Congress’s clear favoring of copyright
interests in duration and scope, unbalances the competing interests of
technology and art.
At the heart of regulating media transmissions are three major
issues:
(1) Whether an entity “transmits” such that it “publicly performs”;
(2) Which governmental body is in the best position to regulate
media transmissions: Congress or the Court; and
(3) Whether it is in the People’s interest to protect copyright
(original works of authorship) over science (technological innovations).
To explore these issues, Part II of this Article will cover
background information on the history of United States copyright laws,
describe the current federal copyright statutory scheme, and review
penalties for copyright infringement.19 Part III will present the
problem: that Congress has caused copyright interests to take over
technological innovation and public access to art.20 Part IV will
introduce Title 17’s Compulsory Licensing scheme, provide an
overview of how jurisprudence has regulated media transmissions of
copyrighted content, and review the recent Aereo21 decision in light of
the 1976 Amendment to the Copyright Act.22 Finally, Part V will
propose two methods to protect authors’ interests to their works
without stifling technological development, in the form of expanding
the Copyright Act’s compulsory licensing provision23 and limiting
copyright duration.24 This solution aims to provide both copyright
owners and technology innovators a just result compatible with
constitutional objectives.25

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Patel, supra note 10, at 1, 4; see also infra note 243.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.
See infra Part IV.
17 U.S.C. § 111 (2016).
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
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BACKGROUND: HISTORY OF FEDERAL COPYRIGHT IN
THE UNITED STATES

A. Origins and Elements of Federal Copyright in the United States
For over two centuries, the United States has officially recognized
a need to protect authors’ works in order to promote the development
of art and science.26 The United States Constitution grants Congress the
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”27 Today,
technology embodies the term “useful arts.”28 “The economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful
Arts.’”29 Congress initially wielded this power in May of 1790 when it
enacted the first federal copyright law.30
This first copyright law designated only “maps, charts and
books.”31 Later statutory enactments recognized music, drama, and
works of art.32 Within two weeks of enacting the first copyright law, a
work was registered with the U.S. district court clerks.33 In 1870 –
almost a century later – copyright functions were centralized in the
Library of Congress.34 Since then, “the Copyright Office has registered
more than 33,654,000 claims to copyright and mask works 35 and
provided many millions of deposits . . . [to its] collections.”36 Today,
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28. See Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 54 (1949).
29. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
30. United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS:
UNITED
STATES
COPYRIGHT
OFFICE,
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html.
31. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 660 (1834) (quoting Copyright Act, 1 Stat. 124
(1790)).
32. Registration of Claims to Copyright, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,605, 37,606 (June 22, 2012)
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
33. United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS:
UNITED
STATES
COPYRIGHT
OFFICE,
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html.
34. Id.
35. A “mask work” is a series of three-dimensional images that are layered to form a
semiconductor chip. 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2) (2016); see also Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
36. United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS:
UNITED
STATES
COPYRIGHT
OFFICE,
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html.
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the Copyright Office registers half a million copyright claims and
records over 11,000 documents with hundreds of thousands of titles
every year; it also “collects for later distribution to copyright holders a
quarter of a billion dollars in cable television, satellite carrier, and
Audio Home Recording Act compulsory license funds.”37
1. Scope of Copyright Protection
“The Copyright Clause . . . empowers Congress to define the
scope of the substantive right.”38 Thus, “Congress’s power to bestow
copyrights is broad.”39 However, this is not a grant of omnipotence as
only original works may be protected,40 for a limited duration,41 from
public performance42 unless licensed.43 Congress has wielded its
legislative power many times to include more types of works, to extend
the duration of copyright, and to clarify copyright holders’ exclusive
rights, most notably in 1909, 1976, and 1988.44
The history of the federal Copyright Act reveals its expansive
amplitude in its recognition of original works of authorship. “‘The two
fundamental criteria of copyright protection [are] originality and
fixation in tangible form . . . .’”45
a. Original Works of Authorship
Initially, “[a] work must be original to be copyrightable.”46
“Original” in the copyright context means that the author
independently created the work (as opposed to copying it from other
works) and thus generated the work with at least some small degree of
creativity.47
Unlike a patent, which protects the idea itself, copyright protects
only the expression of the idea.48 To illustrate, where two authors each
37. Id.
38. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003).
39. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2007).
40. “The sine qua non of copyright is originality.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
41. “[A] copyright must be limited in duration.” Golan, 501 F.3d at 1184.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2016).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2016) (compulsory licensing provisions for cable systems).
44. For a timeline of amendments beginning in 1909, see 1–TL NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT (2015).
45. Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 355 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 51 (1976)).
46. Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 286 (4th Cir. 2007); Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 346
(“Originality is a constitutional requirement.”).
47. Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 345.
48. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Dollcraft Indus., Ltd. v. Well-Made Toy
Mfg. Co., 479 F. Supp. 1105, 1113 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (“[C]opyright law protects an
individual’s concrete expression of his own idea.”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2016) (“In
no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
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independently make their own map of the same territory, and the maps
are perfectly identical, “each [author] may obtain the exclusive right to
make copies of his own particular map, and yet neither will infringe the
other’s copyright.”49 “The copyright protects originality rather than
novelty or invention – conferring only ‘the sole right of multiplying
copies.’”50
Over time, Congress has offered protection to more types of
works. First, only maps, charts, and books were protected.51 Then,
legislation included designing, engraving, and etching.52 In 1831,
musical compositions were added, followed by dramatic compositions
in 1856, and then photographs and their negatives in 1865.53 Today, the
Copyright Act denotes eight categories of works of authorship: “(1)
literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7)
sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.”54 This expansion of
types of works protected over the history of the Copyright Act, and the
current list of categories in which authors may find protection for their
work, reveals the inclusive nature of the Copyright Act’s scope.55
b. Fixed in a Tangible Medium of Expression
The second criteria for copyright protection is that it be “fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which [it] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
49. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Fred Fisher, Inc., v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145,
150–51 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (“[T]wo directories, independently made, are each entitled to
copyright, regardless of their similarity, even though it amount [sic] to identity. Each being
the result of original work, the second will be protected, quite regardless of its lack of
novelty.”)); see also Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 346 (“[A]ssume that two poets, each ignorant
of the other, compose identical poems. Neither work is novel, yet both are original and,
hence, copyrightable.”).
50. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218 (quoting Jewelers Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Publ’g,
281 F. 83, 94 (1922)).
51. Id. at 208 (“In 1790 the First Congress conferred a copyright on ‘authors of any
map, chart, book or books already printed.’”).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 208-09.
54. 17 U.S.C.S. § 102(a) (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through PL 114-288); see also
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 48 (D. Mass. 1990) (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5664) (“[T]he designation ‘works of authorship’ is not meant to be limited to
traditional works of authorship such as novels or plays. Rather, Congress used this phrase to
extend copyright to new methods of expression as they evolve.”).
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2016).
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communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”56
The fixation requirement first appeared in the 1976 Amendment to the
Copyright Act,57 but its appearance denotes only greater flexibility in
Congress’ intent to protect more works.58 Former versions of the
Copyright Act, from the first federal copyright statute in 1790 (listing
maps, books, charts)59 to the Copyright Act of 1909, merely listed
specific works of authorship that could qualify for protection.60 Yet
congressional intent of inclusivity has been expressed since the 1909
Act, wherein section 5 provided that, regarding listed works for
registration, “the above specifications shall not be held to limit the
subject-matter of copyright . . . , nor shall any error in classification
invalidate or impair the copyright protection secured under this Act.”61
Similar to the original work of authorship requirement, fixation is
easily achieved. Here, Congress’ intent to protect a wide range of
works is evidenced by the words “any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed.”62 This language demonstrates that
Congress had technological development in mind when it sought to
protect original works of authorship. Additionally, by outlining
categories of works of authorship63 and having a broad definition of
“fixed,”64 as opposed to presenting a finite list of certain works,65
copyright protection is effectively available to a wider range of
possible works than could otherwise be predicted66 or listed.
For the purposes of this Article, it is important to note that it is
well-established that television shows67 and movies are protected under
56. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2016).
57. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (1976).
58. Copyright Act, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
59. Copyright Act, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
60. See 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1909) (listing books, periodicals, lectures, sermons, addresses,
dramatic or dramatico-muscial compositions, maps, works of art (including models or
designs), reproductions of a work of art, drawings or plastic works of a scientific or
technical character, photographs, prints and pictorial illustrations.
61. Copyright Act, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2016) (emphasis added).
63. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2016).
64. “A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being
transmitted, is ‘fixed’ for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made
simultaneously with its transmission.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016).
65. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 208-210 (1954).
66. “Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but it is
impossible to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will take.” Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 48 (D. Mass. 1990) (citing H.R. REP.
NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664).
67. See United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“A
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the Copyright Act’s “motion pictures and other audiovisual works”
category.68 While a live television broadcast is not per se eligible for
federal copyright protection,69 if it is simultaneously recorded and
transmitted,70 or the work broadcasted is a copyrighted writing,71 it will
qualify for protection.72 Even characters73 and commercials74 are
copyrightable.
c. Copyright Duration
Under the Constitution of the United States, Congress has the task
of defining the scope of authors’ limited private monopoly to their
works, to ensure the public obtains access.75 While authors are initially
vested with the copyright to their work,76 some reproductions of the
work are in the public domain.77 Congress cannot allow copyright to
exist in perpetuity.78 “[A]n infinite copyright would deprive the public
[television] program is a particularized form of expression, not an idea” and is therefore
copyrightable.).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (2016).
69. “Motion pictures do not include ‘live telecasts that are not fixed simultaneously
with their transmission.’” 1–2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.09 n. 29.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52-53
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666 (“[A]ssuming it is copyrightable-as a
‘motion picture’ or ‘sound recording,’ for example-the content of a live transmission should
be accorded statutory protection if it is being recorded simultaneously with its
transmission.”); accord 1–1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08 (“Because most television and
many radio stations now customarily record their live broadcasts on video or audio tape
simultaneously with the live transmission, the effect of the above provision would
apparently render such broadcasts eligible for statutory copyright.”).
71. “[A] live television broadcast of a play or musical composition presents underlying
material that itself qualifies as a writing . . . [T]he broadcast itself is still not a writing; but
because the work being broadcast is a writing, the authors’ exclusive rights include the
control of unauthorized broadcasts.” 1–1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08.
72. See 1–1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08.
73. Especially distinctive characters, such as James Bond, Godzilla, and Rocky Balboa,
have been afforded copyright protection. “[C]opyright protection ‘may be afforded to
characters visually depicted in a television series or a movie.’” Halicki Films, LLC v.
Sanderson Sales & Mktg., 547 F.3d 1213, 1224 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Olson v. NBC., 855
F.2d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1988)).
74. Nichols Agency, Inc. v. Enchanted Child Care, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 774, 782 (D.
Md. 2008) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)) (2007) (“[C]ommercials fall into the category of
‘motion pictures and other audiovisual works.’”).
75. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204–05 (2003) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
76. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2016).
77. Sony, 464 U.S. at 433; see also Warner Bros. Entm’t v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d
584, 596 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[A]s a general proposition, the public is not limited solely to
making exact replicas of public domain materials, but rather is free to use public domain
materials in new ways (i.e., to make derivative works by adding to and recombining
elements of the public domain materials).”).
78. “Congress cannot ‘create[] a species of perpetual . . . copyright.’” Golan v.
Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1183–84 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
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of the benefit—the right to use and enjoy the expression—that it is
supposed to receive in exchange for the grant of monopoly privileges
to the author for a discrete period of time.”79
A modern example can be found in Warner/Chappell Music’s
enforcement of its copyright on the “happy birthday” song lyrics.80 The
company had earned about $2 million a year in royalties for all
renditions of the song,81 despite the fact that it only owned the
copyright to the melody, not the lyrics.82 The company’s profits
endured for more than eighty years to the public’s detriment83 until a
federal court ruled on this matter, thus officially releasing the “happy
birthday” lyrics for all to use.84
d. Term Measurement
An essential question in copyright protection is when an author’s
term of exclusive rights begins. Start dates that have been considered
for measuring the term include the date of creation, the date of
registration with the Library of Congress, the date of first public
dissemination,85 the life of the author, and the date of publication.86
There are certain issues with each, but the common theme is that there
will always inevitably be a gap87 between when the work is created, or
is in the initial stages of creation, or is disseminated, and the date that it
is registered or published.88 Moreover, there are some instances where

Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003)).
79. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1184 (citing Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33–34) (“The rights of a . . .
copyright holder are part of a carefully crafted bargain under which, once the . . . copyright
monopoly has expired, the public may use the . . . work at will and without attribution.”).
80. See Marya v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 975 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
81. Christine Mai-Duc, All the 'Happy Birthday' song copyright claims are invalid,
federal judge rules, LA TIMES, Sept. 22, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-meln-happy-birthday-song-lawsuit-decision-20150922-story.html.
82. See Marya, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 1002–03.
83. See Mai-Duc, supra note 81.
84. See Marya, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 1002–03.
85. “The word ‘dissemination’ is used here in the sense of making the work known to
others by whatever means its nature permits.” Copyright Law Revision Studies, Duration of
Copyright, Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 2d. Sess., Study 30, at 72 (1961),
http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study30.pdf.
86. Copyright Law Revision Studies, Duration of Copyright, Prepared for the
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th
Cong. 2d. Sess., Study 30, at 70–74 (1961), http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study30.pdf.
87. See id. at 74. This is not true of terms set for the “life of the author,” but for
reasons set forth in Part IV(B)(3) of this Article, infra, “life of the author” is not the term
that should be used for copyright protection.
88. Copyright Law Revision Studies, Duration of Copyright, Prepared for the
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th
Cong. 2d. Sess., Study 30, at 70–74 (1961), http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study30.pdf.
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dissemination to the public does not constitute publication,89 so if
publication were the criteria for initializing copyright, some works
would be unprotected even though the public had experienced them.
Accordingly, Congress has not been consistent in its measurement
of the protected term. In 1790, the term began when the title was
recorded in the clerk’s office.90 In 1909, published works received
copyright protection from the date of publication, and unpublished
works received copyright protection from the date of their registration
with the Copyright Office.91 In 1976, Congress again altered its
method.92 Unlike the 1790, 1831, and 1909 Acts, the 1976 Act
protected works created by identified natural persons from the date of
the work’s creation until 50 years after the author’s death.93
Additionally, “[f]or anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and
works made for hire, the 1976 Act provided a term of 75 years from
publication or 100 years from creation, whichever expired first.”94 The
latest amendment to the Copyright Act, the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act (“CTEA”), retains the 1976 measurement
methods95 and does not require registration for copyright protection.96
e. Term Duration
In contrast with the incongruous methods for measuring the start
of the copyright term, consistent throughout the versions of the
Copyright Act is the availability of two terms of copyright protection.97
Though the duration of the terms have changed with each
amendment,98 a copyrighted work is afforded protection over a term,
89. There are “uncertainties as to what constitutes publication” such that “it is difficult
in many situations to determine whether or when publication occurred.” Additionally,
“[w]orks which are performed for millions through the medium of radio and television are
thought to be unpublished in the copyright sense if no copies through which the work can be
visually perceived have been distributed.” Copyright Law Revision Studies, Duration of
Copyright, Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 2d. Sess., Study 30, at 70–71 (1961),
http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study30.pdf.
90. Copyright Act, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
91. Copyright Law Revision Studies, Duration of Copyright, Prepared for the
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th
Cong. 2d. Sess., Study 30, at 70 (1961), http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study30.pdf.
92. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194–95 (2003) (citing Copyright Act §§ 302–
304, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)).
93. Id. (citing Copyright Act § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)).
94. Id. at 195 (citing Copyright Act § 302(c), 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)).
95. See 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2016).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2016) (“registration is not a condition of copyright
protection”).
97. Copyright Act, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (renewal of second term conditioned upon a
second recording within six months before expiration of the first term).
98. See infra notes 101-114 and accompanying text.
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with a second term of equal or lesser duration possible upon renewal.99
Either the author or a designated class of beneficiaries may renew.100
With each amendment to the Copyright Act, Congress has
exercised its constitutional authority101 to extend the duration of the
existing copyright term.102 The first copyright act in 1790 provided that
copyright would endure for 14 years, and could be renewed for a
second term of 14 years103 if the author applied for renewal within one
year of the end of the first term.104 “Congress expanded the federal
copyright term to 42 years in 1831 (28 years from publication,
renewable for an additional 14 years), and to 56 years in 1909 (28 years
from publication, renewable for an additional 28 years).”105 The 1976
Copyright Act provided copyright protection from the date of creation
until 50 years after the author died.106
The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) of 1998
was “the fourth major duration extension of federal copyrights.”107 The
CTEA essentially “[r]etain[ed] the general structure of the 1976 Act,”
but added another 20 years of protection for works created by natural
persons, making copyright endure through the author’s life plus 70
years.108 “For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works
made for hire, the term is 95 years from publication or 120 years from
creation, whichever expires first.”109 In addition, any copyright in its
term of renewal when the CTEA became effective (October 27, 1998),
99. See infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
100. Copyright Law Revision Studies, Renewal of Copyright, Prepared for the
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th
Cong.
2d.
Sess.,
Study
31,
at
110–11
(1961),
http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study31.pdf (Copyright Act of 1790 § 1: “executors,
administrators or assigns”; Act of 1831: “author’s widow and children”); Copyright Law
Revision Studies, Duration of Copyright, Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 2d. Sess., Study
30, at 77 (1961), http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study30.pdf (1909 Act: “author’s
widow, widower, children, the author’s executors, or the next of kin”); 17 U.S.C. §
304(a)(1)(C) (the widow, widower, or children of the author, the author’s executors, or the
author’s next of kin).
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
102. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2007); Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (“Text, history, and precedent . . . confirm that the Copyright
Clause empowers Congress to prescribe ‘limited Times’ for copyright protection and to
secure the same level and duration of protection for all copyright holders, present and
future.”).
103. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194.
104. Copyright Act of 1909, section 23, lines 7–23.
105. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194.
106. Id. at 193.
107. Id. at 194-195 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2002).
108. Id. at 195–96 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2002)); Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d
1179, 1181–82.
109. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 196 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2002)).

174

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.57

receives protection for 95 years from the date its copyright was
originally secured.110

1790
1831
1909
1976

Term Start Date
Registered
Published
Published / Registered
Natural Persons:
Creation
Anonymous / Works
Made for Hire:
Publication or Creation

1998

Natural Persons:
Creation
Anonymous / Works
Made for Hire:
Publication or Creation

1st Term
14 yrs.
28 yrs.
28 yrs.
Natural Persons: 50
yrs. from author’s
death
Anonymous / Works
Made for Hire: 75 or
100 yrs.; first to
expire
Natural Persons: 70
yrs. from author’s
death
Anonymous / Works
Made for Hire: 95 or
120 yrs.; first to
expire

2nd Term
14 yrs.
14 yrs.
28 yrs.
47 yrs.111

67 yrs.112

Extensions in duration have been applied to both future and
existing copyrights.113 “History reveals an unbroken congressional
practice of granting to authors of works with existing copyrights the
benefit of term extensions so that all under copyright protection will be
governed evenhandedly under the same regime.”114 Furthermore,
policy considerations prevent putting an author in a worse position
after the passage of a new act.115
Since its 1998 enactment, the CTEA has since been challenged,116
110. 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (2016).
111. “[C]opyright may be renewed for a second term of forty-seven years.” Capano
Music, a Div. of Britone, Inc. v. Myers Music, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 692, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(citing Copyright Act, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)); 3–9 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.05.
112. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2016).
113. “Thus, in common with the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts, the CTEA’s new terms
apply to both future and existing copyrights.” Eldred, 537 U.S. at 196.
114. Id. at 200.
115. Id. at 204; accord, Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension,
18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 694 (2000) (“[S]ince 1790, it has indeed been
Congress’s policy that the author of yesterday’s work should not get a lesser reward than the
author of tomorrow’s work just because Congress passed a statute lengthening the term
today.”).
116. Petitioners to the action argued, inter alia, that “[e]xtending an existing copyright
without demanding additional consideration . . . bestows an unpaid-for benefit on copyright
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but was upheld on constitutional grounds.117 “Nothing before this Court
warrants construction of the CTEA’s 20-year term extension as a
congressional attempt to evade or override the ‘limited Times’
constraint.”118
2. Transmissions
When copyright subsists pursuant to Title 17, section 102 of the
United States Code, section 106 “grants the copyright holder
‘exclusive’ rights to use and to authorize the use of his work in five
qualified ways, including reproduction of the copyrighted work in
copies.”119 There is no infringement where there is no copying.120 In
congruence with technological development,121 Congress legislated to
protect new forms of copying122 now available through technological
transmission.123
Over time, the technology with which to transmit images, sounds,
and motion pictures has developed and increased the range of ways
works of art can be transmitted. For over a century, Congress has
attempted to account for new ways to ‘copy’ protected works by
granting copyright owners the exclusive right to perform their works
publicly.124
The concept of “public performance” first appeared in 1856,
approximately sixty-six years from the enactment of the first federal
statute.125 The act of January 6, 1897 further extended public
holders and their heirs, in violation of the quid pro quo requirement.” The Court
“demur[red] to petitioners’ description of the Copyright Clause as a grant of legislative
authority empowering Congress ‘to secure a bargain—this for that,’” reasoning that
“Congress could rationally seek to ‘promote . . . Progress’ by including in every copyright
statute an express guarantee that authors would receive the benefit of any later legislative
extension of the copyright term.” Eldred, 537 U.S. 186, 214–15.
117. Id. at 199 (holding the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
constitutional).
118. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 209. “The CTEA’s baseline term of life plus 70 years . . .
qualifies as a ‘limited Tim[e]’ as applied to future copyrights.” Id. at 199.
119. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432–33 (1984)
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 106).
120. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954).
121. “Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying equipment—the printing
press—that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection.” Sony, 464 U.S. at 430.
122. Id. at 430 (“From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to
significant changes in technology.”).
123. “The fortunes of the law of copyright have always been closely connected with . . .
technological improvements in means of dissemination . . . .” Id. n. 12 (citing Foreword to
B. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright, vii-viii (1967)).
124. “[A]ny person entitled thereto . . . shall have the exclusive right . . . to perform or
represent the copyrighted work publicly . . . .” Copyright Act § 1(d)–(e), 35 Stat. 1075
(1909).
125. “The author’s public performing rights were first included in statutory copyright in
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performing rights to musical works.126 Similarly, player pianos and
perforated roles of music preceded the Copyright Act of 1909,127 which
added works prepared for oral delivery and created the “for profit”
limitation.128 When the public performance provision129 was enacted,
“its purpose was to prohibit unauthorized performances of copyrighted
musical compositions in such public places as concert halls, theaters,
restaurants, and cabarets.”130 Commercial radio allowed instantaneous
performance to distant and separate audiences who used their radio sets
to turn the broadcast to audible form.131 Later, Congress passed the
Sound Recording Amendment of 1971132 to address “record piracy”
issues arising from the development of the audio tape recorder.133
Likewise, “innovations in copying techniques gave rise to the statutory
exemption for library copying embodied in § 108 of the 1976 revision
of the Copyright law.”134 Furthermore, technology that enabled
retransmission of television programs by cable or microwave systems
prompted the 1976 enactment of a compulsory licensing scheme135 for
cable companies.136
Manifest in the legislative history of the Copyright Act, and in
present-day judicial interpretation of the terms “public performance”
and “to transmit,” is the ever-broadening scope of the ‘limited private
monopoly’137 that is copyright. Technological innovation has spurred
respect to dramatic works by the act of August 18, 1856.” Copyright Law Revision Studies,
Limitations on Performing Rights, Prepared for the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 2d. Sess., Study 16, at 81 (1960),
http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study16.pdf.
126. Id.
127. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. at 430 n. 11 (citing
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908)).
128. Copyright Law Revision Studies, Limitations on Performing Rights, Prepared for
the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
86th
Cong.
2d.
Sess.,
Study
16,
at
81–82
(1960),
http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study16.pdf.
129. “Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. s 1(e), ‘(t)o perform the copyrighted work
publicly for profit.’” Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157 (1975).
130. Twentieth Century Music, 422 U.S. at 157 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1909)).
131. Id. at 157–58 (Federal courts established that “the broadcast of a copyrighted
musical composition by a commercial radio station was a public performance of that
composition for profit—and thus an infringement of the copyright if not licensed.”).
132. “To amend title 17 of the United States Code to provide for the creation of a limited
copyright in sound recordings for the purpose of protecting against unauthorized duplication
and piracy of sound recording, and for other purposes.” UNITED STATES STATUTES AT
LARGE, PL 92–140, October 15, 1971, 85 Stat. 391.
133. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 n. 11 (1984).
134. Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 n. 11.
135. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(2)(B) and § 111(d)(5) (1976).
136. Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 n. 11.
137. Twentieth Century Music, 422 U.S. 151, 156; Sony, 464 U.S. at 431-32; Harper &
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Congress to expand authors’ copyrights, to the detriment of
transmissions technology.
B. Penalties for Copyright Infringement
Since 1790, the Copyright Act has, in some form, granted certain
recovery to the copyright owner. Over time, criminal penalties for
willful infringement have been added, with threat of more to come.138
Consequently, infringers could face double liability in the form of civil
and criminal penalties.
Anyone who violates any of the copyright owner’s exclusive
rights is an infringer.139 The first federal statute provided that an
infringer would be civilly liable, and that he must “forfeit and pay the
sum of fifty cents for every sheet which shall be found in his . . .
possession . . . .”140 Over time, the amount of damages increased by
type of work under the statute,141 and copyright offenders could also be
halted from infringing upon owners’ rights through injunctive relief.142
The 1909 Act also laid out the penalty for willful infringement,
establishing that knowing and willful for profit copying, or aiding and
abetting of such copying, makes one guilty of a misdemeanor.143 The
same section gave the court discretion to impose a criminal penalty
upon conviction, in the form of a fine from one hundred to one
thousand dollars and/or imprisonment up to one year.144
1. Types of Penalties
Today, the same types of penalties are imposed, to a greater
degree. “The Copyright Act provides the owner of a copyright with a
potent arsenal of remedies against an infringer of his work.”145
Remedies include: injunctions, impoundment and destruction of
violating reproductions, actual damages (including any additional
profits), and attorney’s fees.146 Regarding damages, the copyright
owner may elect to recover an award of statutory damages instead of
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985); see also Graham v.
John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (regarding patents).
138. See infra notes 151–161.
139. Sony, 464 U.S. at 433; 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2016).
140. Copyright Act § 2, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
141. For example, “[i]n the case of dramatic or dramatico-musical or a choral or
orchestral composition, one hundred dollars for the first and fifty dollars for every
subsequent infringing performance.” Copyright Act § 25(b), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
142. Copyright Act § 25(a), 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
143. Copyright Act § 28, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
144. Copyright Act § 28, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
145. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433–34 (1984)
(citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505 (1983)).
146. Sony, 464 U.S. at 433–34 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505 (1983)).
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actual damages and profits.147 The Copyright Act also includes a
provision that the prevailing party may recover full costs and
reasonable attorney’s fees,148 giving copyright owners even more
reason to sue and transmission technology innovators even more reason
to be wary. Furthermore, in the aggregate, statutory damages149 may
become astronomical where there are multiple instances of
infringement such that the final figure awarded may be so gross as to
violate substantive due process.150
2.Willful Infringement
Amendments to the Copyright Act and subsequent judicial
interpretation have widened the threshold for liability. Though “[t]he
Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement
committed by another,”151 and there are “limitations on liability relating
to material online,”152 the ever-expanding range of copyright protection
is likely to impact current and future transmission technologies.153
Additionally, because transmission technology providers may now be
held directly liable154 (as opposed to secondarily liable155) for copyright
infringement,156 there is greater exposure to criminal liability.157
Moreover, the willfulness requirement158 is easier to meet, as
transmission technology providers know that transmissions without a
license constitute copyright infringement.159 In 2014, the White House
147. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2016). See also 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2016) (“In a case
where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that
infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of
statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.”).
148. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2016).
149. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2016).
150. J. Cam Barker, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal FileSharing: The Troubling Effects of Aggregating Minimum Statutory Damages for Copyright
Infringement, 83 TEX. L. REV. 525, 526–(2004) (“Congress should modify the Copyright
Act’s minimum statutory damage provision because, when massively aggregated in the filesharing scenario, it imposes an unconstitutional grossly excessive penalty.”).
151. Sony, 464 U.S. at 434.
152. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2016).
153. See infra Part IV(B)(2).
154. See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (transmission technology
provider found liable for direct infringement); See infra Part IV(B)(2).
155. “Most suits against equipment manufacturers and service providers involve
secondary-liability claims.” Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
156. “The defendant may be held directly liable only if the defendant itself ‘trespassed
on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.’” Id. at 2513 (quoting CoStar Grp., Inc. v.
LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in original).
157. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2016).
158. “‘[W]illfully’ as used in 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) connotes a ‘voluntary, intentional
violation of a known legal duty.’” United States v. Liu, 731 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2013).
159. But see Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511 (“We cannot now answer more precisely how the
Transmit Clause or other provisions of the Copyright Act will apply to technologies not
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and the Department of Justice urged Congress to make willful,
unlicensed streaming of copyrighted content a felony,160 but the Senate
bill introduced to amend the criminal penalty provision was not
enacted.161
II. THE PROBLEM: CONGRESS FAVORS COPYRIGHT DESPITE
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Through its ever-growing Copyright Act, Congress favors
copyright to the detriment of the public interest in promoting
advancements in both science and art. Though technological
developments continue to create new ways to experience art that may
infringe upon copyright holders’ exclusive rights, Congress has lost
sight of the original purpose of copyright as framed in the United States
Constitution.162 By continually expanding copyright owners’ limited
private monopoly,163 Congress is handicapping the public164 and
stripping copyright of its utilitarian purpose of promoting “Progress of
Science and useful Arts.”165 Furthermore, as the Court follows
congressional copyright legislation,166 technological innovation will be
increasingly inhibited in the realm of developing media data
transmissions,167 unless Congress amends the Copyright Act168 to
benefit the public at large rather than a limited range of “owners” who

before us . . . [such as] cloud computing, [remote storage] DVRs, and other novel issues not
before the Court . . . .”).
160. Bill Donahue, White House Says Streaming Online Should Be Felony, LAW 360
(Nov. 19, 2014, 4:30 PM),
http://www.law360.com/technology/articles/597696?nl_pk=73d4406b-27b3-4e54-adf0b7212b7778bd&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=technology;
Monica Rodriguez, On the Legality of Watching Unlicensed TV Streams, Intellectual
Property & Technology Forum at Boston College Law School (Mar. 23, 2015),
http://bciptf.org/?p=1654.
161. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2016); see also S. 978 (112th), GovTrack,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s978.
162. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
163. See supra Part III(B).
164. The longer works are kept from the public domain, the longer, the public must wait
to enjoy the art, create derivative works, and learn. “Potential users of [original works of
authorship] include not only movie buffs and aging jazz fans, but also historians, scholars,
teachers, writers, artists, database operators, and researchers of all kinds—those who want to
make the past accessible for their own use or for that of others.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186, 250 (2003). See also infra Part V(B).
165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. “[T]he financial reward guaranteed to the copyright
holder is but an incident of this general objective, rather than an end in itself.” Berlin v. E.
C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543–44 (2d Cir. 1964).
166. See infra Part IV(B)(1).
167. See Eldred, infra, note 278 and accompanying text.
168. See infra Part V(B).
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may or may not have created the work.169
III. ANALYSIS: REGULATION OF MEDIA TRANSMISSIONS TO
COPYRIGHT’S ADVANTAGE
The history of the battle between copyright owners and media
transmission technologies providers yields a prevailing outcome
favoring copyright owners.170 Whenever the Court sides with the
technology provider, Congress eventually amends the Copyright Act to
override the Court’s decisions, and in effect, increases the scope of
protection for the copyright owner.171 The determination of whether
copyrights or transmissions technologies prevail ultimately turns on
judicial interpretation of terms “public performance” and “transmit” in
view of legislative history and intent.172
A. Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory licensing for cable systems, now codified in Title 17,
section 111, emerged in 1976 as a solution to balance broadcasters’ and
cable systems’ competing interests.173 Where the courts had previously
held that signal amplification resulting in secondary transmission of
broadcasted content did not constitute public performance,174 the 1976
Amendment made clear that cable companies must license the
copyrighted content they enable their subscribers to view.175
When cable was first introduced, the majority of cable television
programming consisted of secondary transmissions, i.e. others’
broadcasted signals.176 Such secondary transmissions enabled “the
unforeseen emergence of cable television as a full competitor to
broadcast television.”177 Essentially, television broadcasting stations
would emit their shows’ signals, and cable television systems would

169. See infra notes 279–283 and accompanying text.
170. See infra Part IV(B).
171. See infra Part IV(B)(2).
172. See infra Part IV(B).
173. “Compulsory licensing not only protects the commercial value of copyrighted
works but also enhances the ability of cable systems to retransmit such programs carried on
distant broadcast signals, thereby allowing the public to benefit by the wider dissemination
of works carried on television broadcast signals.” Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467
U.S. 691, 710–11 (1984).
174. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 400-01
(1968); see also Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 412-15
(1974).
175. “The Copyright Office is the administrative agency charged with overseeing the
compulsory license scheme of Section 111.” WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 594,
604 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) aff’d, 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012).
176. 2–8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18.
177. United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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capture those signals, amplify them, and then transmit them by cable or
microwave over wire to their paying subscribers.178
Despite federal protection for publicly performed works, cable
television systems were not interested in paying licensing fees or
royalties to copyright owners179 for the content they transmitted.180 This
set the stage for the dispute regarding what constitutes “public
performance.” In 1968, the Supreme Court took Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc. (“Fortnightly”) under review.181 The
Court held that cable television systems do not “perform” copyrighted
works within the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act, sections 1(c) and
1(d).182 Though the statutory language must be read through a lens of
“drastic technological change,” the Court reasoned that enhancing the
viewer’s capacity to receive the broadcaster’s signals did not constitute
a “performance.”183
In opposition to the Supreme Court’s interpretation, Congress
amended the Copyright Act to add compulsory licensing for cable
systems.184 Without compulsory licensing, cable systems would have to
negotiate for the rights to every work. Congress decided that copyright
owners deserved compensation, but also that cable systems would need
to be able to operate sustainably.185 “[I]t would be impractical and
unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with
every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable
system.”186
However, the statute applies only to cable systems; it does not
give the same rights to any other transmissions technology.187 Since
“1999, the Copyright Office explicitly rejected the claim that Internet
retransmission services could qualify for a Section 111 license.”188 This
is important because there is a significant public interest in providing
178. 2–8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18.
179. 2–8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18.
180. “Cable television systems receive the signals of television broadcasting stations,
amplify them, and then transmit those signals by cable or microwave, and ultimately send
the signals by wire to their paying subscribers.” 2–8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18.
181. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
182. Id. at 402. Sections 1(c) and 1(d) of the 1909 Copyright Act set forth the copyright
owner’s exclusive rights of performance and delivery of the copyrighted work. Copyright
Act, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
183. Id. at 396, 401.
184. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1976).
185. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 711 n. 15 (1984) (citing H.R.
Rep. No. 94–1476, at 89 (1976)).
186. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 711 n. 15 (1984) (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 94–1476, at 89 (1976)).
187. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2016).
188. WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) aff’d, 691 F.3d
275 (2d Cir. 2012).
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fast and easy access to a wide range of content, which developing
transmission technologies can support. However, because such
technologies are not granted the same compulsory licensing that cable
systems receive, they are left to struggle to license each separate
work.189 Congress has acknowledged this system as “impracticable and
unduly burdensome.”190 Granting one type of technology a licensing
scheme thus frustrates the innovation of new technologies191 that could
be revolutionary in transmissions and mass communication.
B. Media Transmissions Jurisprudence – Redefining “Public
Performance”
Amendments to the Copyright Act have tipped the scales in favor
of copyright owners in cases against transmission technology providers
for copyright infringement, as the Court has found that a greater range
of parties “publicly perform” within the meaning of the Copyright Act.
1. Regulation Prior to the 1976 Amendment
“Under the relevant Supreme Court decisions192 prior to 1976, it
was not a copyright violation for cable television stations to retransmit
the signal of broadcast stations.”193 Under the 1909 Copyright Act,
“which lacked any analog to the Transmit Clause, a cable television
system that received broadcast television signals via antenna and
retransmitted these signals to its subscribers via coaxial cable did not
‘perform’ the copyrighted works and therefore did not infringe
copyright holders’ public performance right.”194 At the time, the
Supreme Court distinguished broadcasters (active performers) from
viewers (passive beneficiaries), though viewers supply their own

189. Crisp, 467 U.S. at 711 n. 15 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 89 (1976)).
190. Id.
191. Amanda Asaro, Stay Tuned: Whether Cloud-Based Service Providers Can Have
Their Copyrighted Cake and Eat it Too, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1107, 1111 (2014)
(proposing “a compulsory licensing scheme specific to cloud-based service providers”).
192. “The relevant history of the Transmit Clause begins with two decisions of the
Supreme Court, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc. and Teleprompter Corp.
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.” Cmty. TV of Utah, LLC v. Aereo, Inc., 997 F.
Supp. 2d 1191, 1199 (D. Utah 2014) (quoting WNET Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676,
685 (2d Cir. 2013) cert. granted sub nom. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014)
rev’d and remanded sub nom. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014)) (internal
citations omitted).
193. United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
194. WNET Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 685, cert. granted sub nom. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 896 (2014) rev’d and remanded sub nom. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2498 (2014) (citing Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 408
(1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1968)).
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equipment for viewing the performance.195
The television broadcaster in one sense does less than the exhibitor
of a motion picture or stage play; he supplies his audience not with
visible images but only with electronic signals. The viewer
conversely does more than a member of a theater audience; he
provides the equipment to convert electronic signals into audible
sound and visible images. Despite these deviations from the
conventional situation contemplated by the framers of the
Copyright Act, broadcasters have been judicially treated as
exhibitors, and viewers as members of a theater audience.
Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not perform. Thus, while both
broadcaster and viewer play crucial roles in the total television
process, a line is drawn between them. One is treated as active
196
performer; the other, as passive beneficiary.

Accordingly, the Court held in Fortnightly that a community
antenna television (“CATV”) system did not publicly perform because
it “no more than enhances the viewer’s capacity to receive the
broadcaster’s signals; it provides a well-located antenna with an
efficient connection to the viewer’s television set.”197 The viewer could
have similarly “erected an antenna on a hill, strung a cable to his house,
and installed the necessary amplifying equipment, [and] he would not
be ‘performing’ the programs he received on his television set.”198
Hence, “the reception and distribution of television broadcasts by the
CATV systems . . . did not constitute a ‘performance’ within the
meaning of the Copyright Act, and thus did not amount to copyright
infringement.”199
Similarly, in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.
(“Teleprompter”), the reception and transmission of “broadcast beams
by means of special television antennae owned and operated by
Teleprompter,” was not public performance where transmission was
made through “cable or a combination of cable and point-to-point
microwave to the homes of subscribers,” and subscribers’ own
television sets converted the electromagnetic signals into images and
sounds.200 Even new functions added to the CATV service did not
make Teleprompter an infringer. “The copyright significance of each of
these functions—program origination, sale of commercials, and
195. 2–8 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.18.
196. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 161 (quoting Fortnightly,
392 U.S. at, 398–99).
197. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. 390, 399.
198. Id. at 400.
199. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 398 (1974) (citing
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. 390).
200. Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 399–400.
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interconnection—suffers from the same logical flaw: in none of these
operations is there any nexus with the defendants’ reception and
rechanneling of the broadcasters’ copyrighted materials.”201
2. Regulation After the 1976 Amendment
After these two essential decisions in favor of transmissions
technology,202 Congress stepped in with the 1976 Amendment to add
and define the terms “to transmit” and “public performance,”203 with
the purpose of abrogating both Teleprompter and Fortnightly.204
[A] sing[er] is performing when he or she sings a song; a
broadcasting network is performing when it transmits his or her
performance (whether simultaneously or from records); a local
broadcaster is performing when it transmits the network broadcast;
a cable television system is performing when it retransmits the
broadcast to its subscribers; and any individual is performing when
he or she plays a phonorecord embodying the performance or
205
communicates it by turning on a receiving set.

Furthermore, “Congress intended to cover all transmission activity
in its broad definition of transmit.”206 “[U]nder the broad definitions
found in § 101 of the [1976] Act, a transmission is a public
performance whether made directly or indirectly to the public and
whether the transmitter originates, concludes or simply carries the
signal.”207 “The concepts of public performance and public display
cover not only the initial rendition or showing, but also any further act
by which that rendition or showing is transmitted or communicated to
the public.”208

201. Id. at 404-405. “[T]his Court has in two recent decisions explicitly disavowed the
view that the reception of an electronic broadcast can constitute a performance, when the
broadcaster himself is licensed to perform the copyrighted material that he broadcasts.”
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 160–61 (citing Fortnightly, 392 U.S.
390; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. 394).
202. Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 403-5.
203. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
204. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504 (2014) (“History makes plain that
one of Congress’ primary purposes in amending the Copyright Act in 1976 was to overturn
this Court’s determination that community antenna television (CATV) systems (the
precursors of modern cable systems) fell outside the Act’s scope.”).
205. WNET Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 685 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub
nom. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014) rev’d and remanded sub nom. ABC,
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5663).
206. Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. S. Satellite Sys., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 808, 12 (D. Minn.
1984) aff’d, 777 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1985).
207. Id. at 813 aff’d, 777 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1985).
208. Id. at 811–12 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 64 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5676).
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Like the language for determining whether a work of authorship is
“fixed,”209 the Transmit Clause’s language, “‘any device or process’ is
‘broad enough to include all conceivable forms and combinations of
wired or wireless communications media, including but by no means
limited to radio and television broadcasting as we know them.’”210 The
Transmit Clause incorporates public performance, which is defined in
17 U.S.C. § 101:
To perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means—
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal
circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display
of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by
means of any device or process, whether the members of the public
capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the
same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different
211
times.

Even after the 1976 Amendment, courts were split regarding
interpretation of “public performance.” In one case, a hotel did “not
violate section 106(4) by providing in-room videodisc players and
renting videodiscs to its guests.”212 There, the court reasoned that there
was no public performance because “[t]he movies are viewed
exclusively in guest rooms, places where individuals enjoy a
substantial degree of privacy, not unlike their own homes.”213
Significant to the lower-court decisions in Aereo,214 the Cartoon
Network (“Cablevision”) case held that a cable company’s DVR
system did not violate owners’ copyrights where the customer “made”
the copies, the cable company’s embodiments of copyrighted programs
were not “fixed,” and playback transmissions were not performances
“to the public.”215
209. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2016).
210. Hubbard Broad, 593 F. Supp. 808, 811–12 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 64
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664).
211. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 45 (D.D.C. 2013)
reconsideration denied, 968 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2013).
212. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc., 866 F.2d 278, 282 (9th
Cir. 1989); see 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1976).
213. Columbia Pictures, 866 F.2d at 281.
214. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) aff’d sub nom.
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013) cert. granted sub nom. ABC,
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 896 (2014) rev’d and remanded sub nom. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
215. Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir.
2008) (Playback of copies by means of cable company’s remote storage digital video
recorder system (RS-DVR) did not directly infringe content providers’ right under 17 USCS

186

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.57

In contrast, a district court found copyright infringement where,
without license to the transmitted content, FilmOn X, an internet-based
television service, assigned each of its subscribers a temporarily
assigned antenna and hard-drive directory.216 With FilmOn X’s service,
“the mini-antennas [were] networked together so that a single tuner
server and router, video encoder, and distribution endpoint [could]
communicate with them all” and FilmOn X captured the television
signal to pass through the “single electronic transmission process of
aggregating servers and electronic equipment.”217 The court reasoned
that “‘[t]he non-public nature of the place of the performance has no
bearing on whether or not those who enjoy the performance constitute
‘the public’ under the transmit clause.’”218 Additionally, an earlier case
involving Aereo, Inc. held that the company had infringed on
copyright.219 “The definitions in the [Copyright] Act contain
sweepingly broad language and the Transmit Clause easily
encompasses Aereo’s process of transmitting copyright-protected
material to its paying customers.”220
3. The United States Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the 1976
Amendment
Today, technological innovation continues to catalyze
amendments to expand the Copyright Act’s scope. Authors retain the
exclusive right to “perform”221 and “display”222 their work publicly.
Indeed, the 1976 Amendment to the Copyright Act actually expanded
the scope of liability, with the addition of the definitions of “to
transmit” and “pubic performance.”223 The Supreme Court of the
United States recently decided to settle the varying interpretations of
these clauses in American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo,

§ 106(4) to publicly perform their copyrighted works because such transmissions were not
performances “to the public” within meaning of 17 USCS § 101 where each RS-DVR
playback transmission was made to single subscriber using single unique copy produced by
that subscriber.).
216. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C.)
reconsideration denied, 968 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2013).
217. Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 47–48 (D.D.C.)
reconsideration denied, 968 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C. 2013).
218. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 48 (quoting Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. WTV
Sys., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1010 (C.D. Cal. 2011)).
219. Cmty. Television of Utah, LLC v. Aereo, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1198 (D.
Utah 2014).
220. Cmty. Television of Utah, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1198.
221. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2016).
222. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (2016).
223. Compare Copyright Act § 101, 90 Stat. 2543-44 (1976) with Copyright Act, 35
Stat. 1075 (1909); see supra Part III(B)(2).
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Inc.224
“For a monthly fee, Aereo offers subscribers broadcast television
programming over the Internet, virtually as the programming is being
broadcast.”225 Much of the programming is copyrighted, and Aereo
neither owns nor licenses the works.226 “Aereo’s system is made up of
servers, transcoders, and thousands of dime-sized antennas housed in a
central warehouse.”227 To watch a television show, the subscriber
selects the currently airing show he wants to watch from a menu on
Aereo’s website.228 That selection prompts the Aereo’s server to tune
an antenna, which is dedicated to that specific subscriber, to the
broadcast airing the selected show.229 Via a transcoder, the signals the
antenna receives are translated “into data that can be transmitted over
the Internet.”230 The same server saves the data for the subscriber in his
specific folder on Aereo’s hard drive and then streams the show to the
subscriber’s screen after a few seconds of programming have been
saved to the folder.231 The subscriber is able to view the entire show
through this stream, only a few seconds behind the broadcast.232
“In Aereo’s view, it does not perform. It does no more than supply
equipment that ‘emulate[s] the operation of a home antenna and [digital
video recorder (DVR)].’”233 However, in view of legislative intent and
history behind the 1976 Amendment,234 the Court brought selfproclaimed ‘equipment-providers’235 within the purview of liability
under the Copyright Act, though precedent236 would have held
otherwise. “Because Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to those
of the CATV companies that Congress amended the Act to reach,
Aereo is not simply an equipment provider.”237
The Court’s ruling confirmed that to perform an audiovisual work
means “‘to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds
accompanying it audible,’”238 and erased the Court’s former line

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
Id. at 2503.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2504.
See infra IV(B)(1–3).
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504.
See supra Part III(B)(1).
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2501.
Id. at 2505-6 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)).
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between broadcaster and viewer with respect to performing a work. 239
In interpreting “public performance,” the Court reasoned, “[t]he Act
thereby suggests that ‘the public’ consists of a large group of people
outside of a family and friends.”240 Additionally, “‘the public’ need not
be situated together, spatially or temporally” for a public performance
to occur in violation of the Copyright Act.241 Accordingly, “the
subscribers to whom Aereo transmits television programs constitute
‘the public’” under the Act.242
4. Aereo’s Aftermath
By holding in favor of copyright and against media transmissions
technology, the Court has empowered Congress’ ever-expanding scope
of copyright. Though the Court essentially limited Aereo to its facts,243
and expressly declined to consider “whether the public performance
right is infringed when the user of a service pays primarily for
something other than the transmission of copyrighted works, such as
the remote storage of content,”244 its ruling endangers technological
innovation because even self-titled ‘equipment providers’ may
“publicly perform.”245
“The majority, Justice Scalia said, reached its conclusion ‘only by
disregarding widely accepted rules for service-provider liability and
adopting in their place an improvised standard (‘looks-like-cable-TV’)
that will sow confusion for years to come.’”246 Furthermore, “a
decision in the Networks’ favor will stifle technological innovation and
imperil billions of dollars of investments in cloud-storage services.”247

239. Id. at 2505 (“Congress enacted new language that erased the Court’s line between
broadcaster and viewer, in respect to ‘perform[ing]’ a work.”).
240. Id. at 2510.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 2509.
243. “In other cases involving different kinds of service or technology providers, a
user’s involvement in the operation of the provider’s equipment and selection of the content
transmitted may well bear on whether the provider performs within the meaning of the Act.”
Id. at 2507.
244. Id. at 2511.
245. Hughes, supra note 13, at 3 (“The court said it has yet to consider if public
performance rights are infringed by such actions as the remote storage of content.”); accord
WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 280 (2d Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1585
(2013) (“Additionally, the growth of ‘cloud-based systems,’ or virtual platforms where
content resides remotely on a distant server, further highlights the uncertainty as to whether
an Internet retransmission service is or utilizes a facility that receives and retransmits
television signals.”); but see Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2510 (“Congress, while intending the
Transmit Clause to apply broadly to cable companies and their equivalents, did not intend to
discourage or to control the emergence or use of different kinds of technologies.”).
246. Copyright Infringement, 26 BUS. TORTS REP. 290, 294 (2014).
247. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2518 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia’s prediction may already be coming true, as since the
Supreme Court’s decision, Aereo was forced to file for Chapter 11
bankruptcy.248
Though the Court held that Aereo’s activities were substantially
similar to CATV companies such that it infringed under the Copyright
Act,249 the Copyright Office later denied the company a compulsory
license,250 which would have enabled it to continue its business
provided that it comply with the rules of Title 17, section 111 and pay
royalties to the copyright owners.251 Consequently, $95 million in
venture capital equity has been squandered on technology that has been
given no way to survive the onslaught of regulation.252 Aereo’s
creditors are each claiming in the range of $117,000 to $600,000,253
and potentially tens of millions in damages to the broadcasters that
hold contingent claims against it.254
In the holding that launched Aereo’s demise, the Court
recommended that “commercial actors or other interested entities” seek
action from Congress to address their concerns “with the relationship
between the development and use of such technologies and the
Copyright Act.”255 Similarly, “the dissenters predicted that Congress
may decide that the Copyright Act ‘needs an upgrade.’”256
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Return to a Balance
The mouth of the Copyright Act has become so great as to
248. Pete Brush, Aereo Files for Ch. 11 in Bid to Dodge Copyright Suits, LAW 360
(Nov. 21, 2014, 10:59 AM),
http://www.law360.com/media/articles/598433?nl_pk=168332d2-9841-4bc9-9ea4274664e5dda0&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=media.
249. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2506.
250. In a letter to Aereo, “the Copyright Office says that . . , ‘internet retransmissions of
broadcast television’ still fall outside the scope of their ability to license under section 111.”
Kate Cox, Copyright Office Disagrees with Aereo That Aereo is a Cable Company Now,
CONSUMERIST (July 17, 2014), http://consumerist.com/2014/07/17/copyright-officedisagrees-with-aereo-that-aereo-is-a-cable-company-now/, also available at http://www.
nab.org/documents/newsRoom/pdfs/071614_Aereo_Copyright_Office_letter.pdf.
251. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2014). “Section 111 creates a complex, highly detailed
compulsory licensing scheme that sets out the conditions, including the payment of
compulsory fees, under which cable systems may retransmit broadcasts.” Aereo, 134 S. Ct.
at 2506.
252. Andrew Scurria, Aereo Plans to Shop Infringing Streaming IP in Ch. 11, LAW 360
(Nov. 24, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/598816/aereo-plans-to-shopinfringing-streaming-ip-in-ch-11.
253. Brush, supra note 248.
254. Scurria, supra note 252.
255. Id. at 2511.
256. Hughes, supra note 13, at 4.
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swallow technological innovation. Every congressional amendment has
enlarged its hungry jaw further, reaching a wider range of works,
audiences, and performances, for a longer and longer duration. While it
is important to compensate authors as encouragement and reward for
their work, the original purpose of awarding a limited private
monopoly has been lost in the money feast on original sales,
retransmission fees,257 and infringement penalties;258 copyright has
become more about compensating the copyright owner than about
promoting art for society. Consequently, both art and science suffer.
The principal purpose of the Copyright Act of 1976 is to “promote
progress of the ‘useful arts’ . . . by rewarding creativity, and its
principal function is the protection of original works, rather than
ordinary commercial products that use copyrighted material as a
marketing aid.”259 Like patent law, copyright law rewards the owner as
a secondary consideration.260 “[Copyright law] is intended definitely to
grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without
burdensome requirements; to afford greater encouragement to the
production of literary (or artistic) works of lasting benefit to the
world.”261
B. Amend the Copyright Act
In view of the messy legislative history and flip-flopping media
jurisprudence,262 it is crucial that Congress legislate clearly and with
the mindset that technological innovation is fast-paced and
unpredictable. Additionally, the foremost consideration should be the
Constitution itself, which grants Congress its power to establish
copyright protection to advance both arts and sciences.263 To balance
these competing interests, Congress should amend the Copyright Act to
(1) allow compulsory licensing for any transmission technology, and
(2) grant an author exclusive rights under a single term of a ten-year
duration,264 not renewable by any person or corporation, with the term
determined by the date of creation.265
257. “CBS . . . said earlier this year that it’s going to make $1 billion a year in
retransmission fees by 2017, and $2 billion by 2020.” Bill Donahue, FCC Chair Debuts
Plan to Treat Web TV Like Cable, LAW 360 (Oct. 28, 2014, 8:00 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/591356/fcc-chair-debuts-plan-to-treat-web-tv-like-cable.
258. See supra Part I(B).
259. Quality King Distribs. v. L’anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135, 151 (1998).
260. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (internal quotations omitted).
261. Id.
262. See supra Part III(B).
263. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 8.
264. Or briefer.
265. Measurement of the copyright term should remain as specified under 17 U.S.C. §
302(c). See supra Part I(A)(1)(i)(e) term duration chart.
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1. Congress is in the Best Position to Create Balance
“Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent
deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
market for copyrighted materials.”266 “Congress has the constitutional
authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied
permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by
such new technology.”267 Furthermore, the Court will ultimately defer
to Congress’ legislation just as it did in Aereo,268 so it is important that
Congress determine United States copyright policy.
2. Compulsory Licensing for Any Transmission Technology
Compulsory licensing should not be limited to cable systems.269
Rather, section 111 of Title 17 should reflect the encompassing
language of section 102270 and allow any technology, “now known or
later developed” to be permitted a compulsory license under the
Copyright Act.
As technologies have developed,271 Congress has continued to
amend the Copyright Act to protect copyright owners. The Copyright
Act should be similarly amended to allow new technologies to transmit
works to the public. Congress should incorporate to the compulsory
license section broad language that would account for any current and
future transmission technology. Allowing other technologies to license
in bulk rather than piecemeal would allow greater competition in the
media transmission industry, which is in the interest of the public
(access to copyrighted media), the economy (competition fosters
business), and technological innovation (transmission and
telecommunication technologies would be championed and stimulated,
rather than suppressed).272
3. Ten-year Copyright Term
At the time the Constitution was enacted in 1790, the Framers
could not have anticipated the technology we have today and the rapid
pace at which it evolves. Consequently, Congress’ discretion to
266. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
267. Sony, 464 U.S. at 431.
268. See supra Part III(B)(3).
269. See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2016).
270. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2016); see supra Part I(A)(1)(i)(b).
271. Sony, 464 U.S. at 462 n. 9 (Congress has been “spurred” to action when
“significant developments in technology and communication” render the Copyright Act
inadequate with regard to protecting copyright owners.).
272. Aereo’s demise may have been prevented if it had been permitted to obtain a
compulsory license. See Bill Donahue, Aereo Can’t Use Compulsory License, Judge Says,
LAW 360 (Oct. 23, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/589934.
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continue expanding copyrights is nearly boundless, so long as there is
some time limitation on the grant of exclusive rights to copyright
owners. This burden is easily met so long as Congress does not bestow
rights in perpetuity to authors.
As evidenced by the significant extension of time273 added to the
duration of exclusive rights for copyright holders nearly every time the
Copyright Act is amended,274 Congress is wielding its power to the
point of excess. Though being very inclusive in the scope of works
protected promotes authorship, as intended under the Constitution, the
consistent extension of copyright duration does not. Having a longterm grant of exclusive rights to original works of authorship is
problematic for three reasons:
(1) It deprives the public of the ability to use original works to
create derivative works for up to two lifetimes275 from when the work
was first created;
(2) It rewards those “heirs, estates, or corporate successors” who
did not create the work276 and will likely maintain and extend the
monopoly for the second term, keeping the work from the public;277
and
(3) It inhibits the progress of technological innovation.278
a. Public Deprivation
First, granting a limited monopoly in copyright, like in patent,
withholds works of significance from public use unless the author
deems otherwise. Instead of withholding works, our society should
consider releasing them for public use after the author receives
compensation.
The Copyright Act “imposes upon the public certain expressionrelated costs in the form of (1) royalties that may be higher than
273. Most recently, “[t]he economic effect of [the Copyright Term Extension Act’s] 20–
year extension—the longest blanket extension since the Nation’s founding—is to make the
copyright term not limited, but virtually perpetual.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243
(2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
274. See supra Part I(A)(1)(i)(c).
275. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2016) provides for a term of seventy years after the life of the
author; so if the author is young, and people live on average for about seventy years, the
copyright term could be for approximately two lifetimes.
276. “[The CTEA’s] primary legal effect is to grant the extended term not to authors, but
to their heirs, estates, or corporate successors.” Eldred, 537 U.S. at 243 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
277. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(1)(C) (2016) allows certain others to renew the author’s
copyright for a second term of sixty-seven years, during which time said beneficiaries could
continue to benefit from royalties, so there is every reason to keep the work from the public
domain.
278. “[The CTEA’s] practical effect is not to promote, but to inhibit, the progress of
‘Science.’” Eldred, 537 U.S. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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necessary to evoke creation of the relevant work, and (2) a requirement
that one seeking to reproduce a copyrighted work must obtain the
copyright holder’s permission.”279 Higher royalties mean higher costs,
which could limit dissemination of artwork to the public.280
Attempting to license works is an additional burden that could
prohibit reproduction or creation of a derivative work even where an
author would not object,281 just because of the difficulty of obtaining
permission.282 This burden could also prohibit the public from learning
about and researching protected works.283
Open-sourcing content, or releasing works into the public domain,
would allow the public to build upon the art in society, furthering
creativity, art, and expression. It would also provide a greater range of
works for society to enjoy and from which to learn, for broadcasters
and publishers to transmit, produce, perform, and exploit, and would
enable the public to access both classic and newer works. Tesla Motors
Inc. (“Tesla”), an electric car manufacturer and distributor, has
successfully promoted this idea, and should serve as an example for
copyright.
In June 2014, Tesla released its vehicle patents to the public for
good faith use.284 Tesla’s open-source approach promotes futuristic
thinking and the idea that “[t]echnology leadership is not defined by
patents, which history has repeatedly shown to be small protection
indeed against a determined competitor, but rather by the ability of a
company to attract and motivate the world’s most talented
engineers.”285 Moreover, “Tesla shares barely moved after the
company’s announcement. The stock closed down 95 cents, or less

279. Id. at 248 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
280. Id.
281. The permissions requirement is prohibitive: “(1) because it may prove expensive to
track down or to contract with the copyright holder, (2) because the holder may prove
impossible to find, or (3) because the holder when found may deny permission either
outright or through misinformed efforts to bargain.” Id. at 250 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 248 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
283. “Indeed, in an age where computer-accessible databases promise to facilitate
research and learning, the permissions requirement can stand as a significant obstacle to
realization of that technological hope.” Id. 250 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
284. Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong to You, TESLA, (June 12, 2014),
http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you; Jerry Hirsch & Tiffany
Hsu, Elon Musk Opens Up Tesla Patents; It ‘Isn’t Entirely Altruistic’, LA TIMES, June 12,
2014, 3:48 PM, http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-elon-musk-opens-teslapatents-20140612-story.html#page=1; Brian Solomon, Tesla Goes Open Source: Elon Musk
Releases Patents to ‘Good Faith’ Use, FORBES, (June 12, 2014, 1:21 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2014/06/12/tesla-goes-open-source-elon-muskreleases-patents-to-good-faith-use/.
285. Elon Musk, All Our Patent Are Belong to You, TESLA, (June 12, 2014),
http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you.
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than 1%, at $203.52.”286 Elon Musk, chief executive officer of Tesla,
reasoned, “You want to be innovating so fast that you invalidate your
prior patents, in terms of what really matters. It’s the velocity of
innovation that matters.”287
Similarly, the Copyright Act should reflect long-term thinking in
favor of the public good, as opposed to extending the time for a few
very lucrative works to make money.288 There is plenty of money to be
made when new works are created, and new derivations of popular
works may become equally popular. Accordingly, the duration of
copyright should be limited so as to enable authors to be rewarded for
their works, but then to also promptly enable the public to both use and
enjoy said original works.
Authors will also benefit from this approach because it will
increase the competition and range of works that may be created.
Greater competition means more works and potentially more profit.
Authors will be compensated, but publishers, broadcasters, and other
interested transmitters of copyrighted works will need to compensate
authors at the outset instead of making long-term royalty payments.
Though this may be riskier than making royalty payments based on
percentage of sales, most business investments involve some degree of
risk. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that shortening the duration
of copyright would prevent authors from getting paid, as publishers,
broadcasters, and the like will still need new content to distribute, and
advertisers will still need audiences.
b. Non-Authors Rewarded
Second, instead of furthering the trend of taking works out of the
public domain and limiting access, the public domain should be
expanded. It is to both the author’s and the public’s advantage “to
provide an adequate term of protection to make it commercially
feasible for publishers and other distributors to aid him in exploiting
his work,”289 as allowing the author to make money encourages artistic
286. See Hirsch & Hsu, supra note 284.
287. Mike Masnick, Of Course Tesla Wasn’t Just Being Altruistic In Opening Up Its
Patents: That’s The Whole Point!, TECHDIRT, (June 23, 2014, 9:03 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140622/06531127647/course-tesla-wasnt-just-beingaltruistic-opening-up-its-patents-thats-whole-point.shtml; Ashlee Vance, Why Elon Musk
Just Opened Tesla’s Patents to His Biggest Rivals, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (June 12,
2014, 4:52 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-12/why-elon-muskjust-opened-teslas-patents-to-his-biggest-rivals.
288. See supra notes 286–87 and accompanying text.
289. Copyright Law Revision Studies, Duration of Copyright, Prepared for the
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th
Cong. 2d. Sess., Study 30, at 74 (1960), http://copyright.gov/history/studies/study30.pdf;
accord Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 23 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[C]opyright law should be
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creation. However, the current duration of seventy years beyond the
author’s death is a grossly unnecessary grant of protection. Limiting
the duration of exclusive copyright ownership to 10 years will “serve[]
the ultimate purpose of promoting the ‘Progress of Science and useful
Arts’ by guaranteeing that those innovations will enter the public
domain as soon as the period of exclusivity expires.”290
“The Clause authorizes a ‘tax on readers for the purpose of giving
a bounty to writers.’”291 Once that ‘tax’ has been paid, the work should
be released. “[O]nly about 2% of copyrights between 55 and 75 years
old retain commercial value—i.e., still generate royalties after that
time.”292 Of that two percent, “books, songs, and movies . . . still earn
about $400 million per year in royalties.”293 In his dissent to a Supreme
Court case upholding the constitutionality of the Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1988, Justice Breyer reasoned, “one might
conservatively estimate that 20 extra years of copyright protection will
mean the transfer of several billion extra royalty dollars to holders of
existing copyrights—copyrights that, together, already will have earned
many billions of dollars in royalty ‘reward.’”294 Essentially, the rich are
getting richer, at the public’s expense.
The Constitution does not propose rewarding anyone other than
the author of the work. Thus, those who have not made the works
should not be permitted to monopolize works for the purpose of private
profit. “The [Copyright] Clause exists not to ‘provide a special private
benefit,’ but ‘to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good.’”295 Additionally, shortening the copyright term will allow the
public to benefit from original works of authorship and to create more
works based on the originals.
c. Technological Innovation Inhibited
Finally, innovation is being crushed in copyright’s hungry jaw.
With all of the penalties for infringement,296 uncertainty as to what will
constitute infringement given the narrow Aereo ruling,297 and lack of
used to recognize the important role of the artist in our society and the need to encourage
production and dissemination of artistic works by providing adequate legal protection for
one who submits his work to the public.”).
290. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003).
291. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 248 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing E. Rappaport, CRS Report for Congress,
Copyright Term Extension: Estimating the Economic Values (1998)).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 249.
295. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)) (internal citations omitted).
296. See supra Part I(B).
297. See supra Part III(B)(3).
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viable alternatives to sustain business after the Court has ruled,298 it
does not make sense to invest in innovative transmission technologies
as an inventor, investor, or businessperson.
“[C]opyright was designed ‘primarily for the benefit of the
public,’ for ‘the benefit of the great body of people, in that it will
stimulate writing and invention.’”299 Copyright will serve this purpose
if it is limited in duration to ten years. With the speed of technological
innovation and the public interest in developing telecommunications,
there is every reason to limit copyright to encourage innovation and
investment therein.
Encouraging innovation will also increase accessibility to art
works, which is desirable for both authors and the public. For authors,
greater dissemination potentially means greater popularity, which
means greater compensation from publishers, broadcasters, or other
licensed distributors. For the public, works can be enjoyed via any
available means – in person at a museum, in bed on a smart phone, on a
plane using a tablet, at a friend’s house on a television screen, etcetera.
Greater accessibility likely means more views, more purchases, and
more advertising revenue.
This duration limitation will also enable competition in
transmissions technologies and decrease cases of infringement, like
Aereo, that completely quash transmission technology business.
Currently, copyright law is overbroad,300 and so heavily litigated that
new transmissions technologies do not stand a chance. “The primary
objective of copyright” is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science.”301
Therefore, authors should be rewarded with private monopolies only to
the extent that the reward encourages authorship and does not suppress
technological innovation. Limiting the copyright term to a ten-year
duration could achieve this goal.
C. Application of Proposal to Aereo, Inc.
If this proposal were in effect, Aereo, Inc. would likely still be in
business today, serving the public and developing new technology. 302
Likewise, artists would likely still produce works, as this proposal
would incentivize the production of copyrightable works for a ten-year
298. See Hughes, supra, at note 245 and accompanying text.
299. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 247 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R.Rep.
No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 6–7 (1909)).
300. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 211–12 (“The CTEA’s extension of existing copyrights
categorically fails to ‘promote the Progress of Science,’ petitioners argue, because it does
not stimulate the creation of new works but merely adds value to works already created.”).
301. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. at 349).
302. See Patel, supra note 10, at 1, 5.
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term.
Alternatively, under a compulsory licensing scheme that would
permit all types of transmission technologies,303 Aereo could have
obtained a compulsory license for transmitting those works still
copyrighted and the vastly greater number of works that would be in
the public domain. The public would benefit from good prices and
greater access to works,304 and Aereo could have used its profits to
develop its transmissions capabilities, again serving the public through
technological development.
Furthermore, copyright owners would obtain incentives to
produce more works through the retransmission fees Aereo would pay;
and those whose works had entered the public domain would have
every reason to again produce more work to capitalize on the public
demand for media. Thus, both science and art would develop with the
aid of the other in a way that would benefit businesses, artists, and,
most importantly, the public.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, copyright is overwhelming the progression of
transmission technology and is threatening the future of such
innovation.
Congress should return to the underlying purpose of its
constitutional grant of authority and limit copyright duration such that
science may balance with art. I propose limiting the scope of copyright
duration in accordance with the Constitution. This solution would
balance the public’s competing interests: “Creative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve
the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music,
and the other arts.”305 Lest the public suffer from loss of both art and
science, Congress should prevent copyright takeover. To do so, the
interests of the public in accessing both innovative transmission
technologies and works of art must be weighed over any private
monetary interests.

303. See supra Part IV(B)(2).
304. See supra Part IV(B)(3).
305. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431–32 (1984).

